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In an article entitled Jurisdiction and Its Effects, I argued that
jurisdiction has inherent descriptive meaning but mutable effects. In
response, Professor John Preis challenges my framework on a
number of grounds and offers his own presumption-based approach.
In this reply, I defend my original framework and register my own
skepticism of his alternative approach.
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INTRODUCTION
In an article entitled Jurisdiction and Its Effects, I made two
arguments that turned jurisdictional orthodoxy on its head.1 First,
I argued that jurisdiction has inherent descriptive meaning: juris-
diction refers to legal boundaries that “determine[ ] forum in a mul-
tiforum system.”2 Second, I argued that jurisdiction’s effects are
mutable and subject to positive law.3 I then explained how this re-
calibration of jurisdiction’s identity offered a variety of salutary ben-
efits for existing doctrine, precedent, and litigation practice.4 
Professor John Preis has responded to my article by challenging
my framework and offering an alternative of his own.5 He denies
that jurisdiction has an immutable definition and argues instead
that Congress can call whatever it wishes “jurisdictional” or “nonjur-
isdictional.”6 He also objects that my framework leaves little work
for the term jurisdiction; the game is all in the effects.7 Finally, he
offers a different approach, which is to recognize a presumption in
favor of my definition that is nevertheless defeasible by a clear
statement from Congress.8
In this reply, I take on his critique and defend my original frame-
work as the best approach. In Part I, I summarize the basic ar-
guments and merits of my framework. In Part II, I defend my
framework against Professor Preis’s criticisms. First, I correct sever-
al mistakes Professor Preis makes in interrogating my framework.
1. See Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619 (2017).
2. Id. at 633-37.
3. Id. at 631.
4. See id. at 637-55. The article builds on some of my foundational prior work, including
Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439 (2011), and Scott Dodson,
Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2008). I acknowledge that the Supreme Court has per-
sisted in charting a different path for jurisdictional-characterization questions. See Hamer v.
Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 21-22 (2017).
5. John F. Preis, Jurisdictional Idealism and Positivism, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1416
(2018).
6. Id. at 1427 (“The central flaw in jurisdictional idealism is that it overlooks Congress’s
long-standing power to define federal jurisdiction.”).
7. Id. at 1430-31 (“The upshot of such an approach is that the law of jurisdiction will be
replaced with the law of effects.”).
8. Id. at 1439 (imposing a presumption, rebuttable by a clear statement, against
jurisdictionality when Congress “wishes to make unorthodox jurisdictional choices”).
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Second, I explain why an immutable definition of jurisdiction is
more defensible than a positivist conception of jurisdiction. Third,
I show that the term “jurisdiction” has continued utility and should
be retained. In Part III, I lodge my own objections to Professor
Preis’s alternative approach. 
I. JURISDICTION AND ITS EFFECTS
It is a familiar lament that jurisdiction has “many, too many,
meanings.”9 To remedy the problem, the Supreme Court has attemp-
ted to bring discipline to the use of the term by erecting a set of
guideposts for determining when something is jurisdictional. The
primary guidepost is a recognition that jurisdiction is a positivist
concept: Congress gets to say when something is jurisdictional,10
and, when it clearly demarcates a boundary as jurisdictional, so be
it.11 Jurisdiction’s definition, therefore, is elusive, for Congress can
use it to describe whatever kind of limit it wishes.
At the same time, current doctrine makes jurisdiction’s effects im-
mutable. Those effects are rote for any law student: the parties can-
not waive or forfeit jurisdictional defects; parties cannot consent to
jurisdiction; jurisdictional defects cannot be excused for reasons of
equity or judicial discretion cannot excuse jurisdictional defects; the
court must verify jurisdiction sua sponte, and jurisdictional defects
can be raised at any time, by any party, before final judgment; and
9. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting United States
v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
10. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514-15 (2006) (stating that Congress
could make statutory limits jurisdictional); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004) (“Only
Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
11. See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2017) (“If a time
prescription governing the transfer of adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to
another appears in a statute, the limitation is jurisdictional.”); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16
(imposing a clear statement rule).
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judgments lacking jurisdiction are void.12 In conventional wisdom,
jurisdiction’s definition may be mutable, but its effects are not.
I have offered an approach that inverts current doctrine. Under
my framework, jurisdiction has definitional meaning: “it determines
forum in a multiforum system.”13 Any such boundary—subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction—is
jurisdictional by definition.14 All other limits—statutes of limita-
tions, immunity, limits on remedies, statutory coverage limits—are
nonjurisdictional by definition.15 This definition is inherent and im-
mutable; it is not subject to the whims of Congress. Congress can no
more call something nonjurisdictional that is, or something
jurisdictional that is not, any more than one could try to call a sheep
a wolf. A sheep is a sheep.16 And a law that determines forum in a
multiforum system is a jurisdictional law.
By contrast, the effects of a particular jurisdictional law may be
set by positive law.17 If the jurisdictional law is statutory, then
Congress gets to prescribe whether the jurisdictional limits can be
waived or forfeited, are subject to judicial discretion, and the like.18
If the jurisdictional law is a judicial creation—like abstention—
then the courts can prescribe its effects in the absence of statu-
tory override.19 If the jurisdictional law is constitutional, then the
12. See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951) (explaining that judicial
interpretation and prior action or consent of litigants guard against expansion of jurisdiction,
for example, in preventing federal courts from making judgments in cases lacking original
jurisdiction); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934) (noting that parties cannot agree
to waive or overcome lack of federal jurisdiction, and that in diversity jurisdiction cases,
parties can raise jurisdictional defects at any point); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413,
416 (1923) (noting federal district courts have original, not appellate, jurisdiction); Mansfield,
Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884) (noting jurisdiction fails
if not appearing in the pleadings or record and a federal court can deny its own or any lowers
court’s jurisdiction); McNitt v. Turner, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 352, 366 (1872) (explaining that
jurisdiction is conclusive). For a recent summary, see Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 17.
13. Dodson, supra note 1, at 634.
14. Id. at 634-35.
15. Id. at 636-37.
16. Cf. Preis, supra note 5, at 1417-18 (using the sheep analogy).
17. See Dodson, supra note 1, at 637 (“Positive law, then, can prescribe whatever effects
best fit a particular jurisdictional line.”).
18. Many examples exist. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2012) (providing for judicial discretion
in exercising supplemental jurisdiction); id. § 2107(c) (providing for equitable exceptions to
the appellate deadline).
19. See Dodson, supra note 1, at 644-45 (describing examples of federal courts exercising
the doctrine of abstention to determine the proper forum of a proceeding).
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Constitution, as a source of positive law, may supply its effects.20 In
this way, the term “jurisdiction” actually means something—it de-
fines which courts have authority to hear a case and which do not—
but positive law can mold the effects of a particular jurisdictional
line to fit its context and litigation realities.
These two moves upend current doctrine. Right now, jurisdic-
tion’s definition is subject to positive law while its effects are static
and immutable.21 I mean to switch those around, with some dra-
matic and unorthodox results, and I am not surprised that my pro-
posal has generated some resistance, including from Professor Preis.
I now turn to his criticisms.
II. RESPONSES TO CRITICISMS
In this Part, I respond directly to Professor Preis’s criticisms. I
begin by correcting his misunderstanding of my approach. Then, I
defend my approach against his positivist challenge. Finally, I an-
swer his objection that jurisdiction lacks meaning under my frame-
work.
A. Getting the Argument Right
The first step is to understand my approach, and Professor Preis
makes at least three mistakes in recounting and applying it.
First, Professor Preis asserts that my definition “falters” because
he thinks that I “overlook[ ] Congress’s long-standing power to de-
fine federal jurisdiction”22 and that I “fail[ ] to acknowledge that
Congress has a wide-ranging power to draw boundaries.”23 Assum-
ing he means “define [the scope of] federal jurisdiction,” then I do
nothing of the sort. I accept that Congress’s constitutional power to
“ordain and establish” inferior federal courts24 includes the power
to set the scope of their adjudicative authority (within constitution-
al bounds), including the power to draw both jurisdictional and
20. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
21. See Dodson, supra note 1, at 621 (describing the current understanding of
jurisdiction).
22. Preis, supra note 5, at 1427.
23. Id. at 1429.
24. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause). 
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nonjurisdictional boundaries.25 If Congress wishes to impose an
amount-in-controversy requirement on the diversity jurisdiction of
the federal district courts, it of course may do so, at whatever
amount it wishes. Similarly, if Congress wishes to set certain forms
of service of process in the federal courts, it may do so, consistent
with due process. The Constitution grants Congress the authority
to draw both nonjurisdictional and jurisdictional lines and to supply
the content of those lines, and nothing in my framework suggests
otherwise.
But I do deny that Congress has the power to define which lines
are jurisdictional and which are nonjurisdictional. Once Congress
draws lines, those lines’ characterizations arise directly from them.
The amount-in-controversy requirement is jurisdictional because it
determines which cases can be heard in federal court and which
cases can be heard in state court.26 Service of process is nonjuris-
dictional because it speaks only to the limits of the federal courts
and not to alternate forums.27 Congress may, when consistent with
the Constitution, draw the lines in any place, and with whatever
content, that it wishes.28 But Congress may not call the amount-in-
controversy requirement nonjurisdictional and the service rule
jurisdictional, and nothing in the Constitution says otherwise.
Second, Professor Preis misapplies my framework to the amount-
in-controversy requirement of diversity jurisdiction29 and the
employee-numerosity requirement of Title VII.30 Because I assert
that the employee-numerosity requirement is nonjurisdictional,31
Professor Preis believes I must also think the amount-in-contro-
versy requirement nonjurisdictional.32
25. Dodson, supra note 1, at 631 (“I have no quarrel with Congress’s constitutional
prerogative to limit the authority of the federal courts.”).
26. See id. at 638 (“[T]he amount-in-controversy requirement is a limit on the eligibility
of [a] case for a federal forum under diversity jurisdiction.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)).
27. See id. at 636.
28. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012) (limiting diversity jurisdiction to cases in which the amount
“in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs”).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (defining “employer” as having “fifteen or more
employees”).
31. Dodson, supra note 1, at 636.
32. Preis, supra note 5, at 1428 (“If Congress cannot make the number of employees in a
Title VII case jurisdictional, the argument goes, then Congress presumably cannot make the
number of dollars at stake jurisdictional either.”).
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But this is a fundamental misunderstanding of the operation of
the two requirements. The employee-numerosity requirement sets
a limit on the scope of Title VII’s substantive obligations irrespec-
tive of the forum; it applies equally to limit adjudicatory authority
in both federal court and state court.33 Professor Preis is wrong to
say that “plaintiffs suing employers with fewer than fifteen employ-
ees can simply take their cases to state courts.”34 The employee-
numerosity requirement limits the claim in state court, too. The
claim is either viable (because the requirement is met) or not
(because it is not met), and viability has no bearing on forum.
Accordingly, the requirement does not determine forum in a multi-
forum system, and, as a result, it is nonjurisdictional.35
The amount-in-controversy requirement is very different. It does
speak to forum. A tort claim between diverse parties may have any
number of restrictions on it akin to the employee-numerosity
requirement of Title VII—limitations periods, damages limits, et
cetera—but the amount-in-controversy requirement is not one of
them. Instead, the amount-in-controversy requirement determines
in which forum a litigant may adjudicate the claim. If the require-
ment is met, then either federal or state court may hear the claim.36
If not, then only a state court may hear the claim.37 The require-
ment determines forum in a multiforum system and is therefore
jurisdictional by definition. 
Professor Preis further confuses this distinction by hypothesizing
an employee-numerosity requirement phrased as, “federal district
courts shall only have jurisdiction to consider claims under this Act
if the employer accused of violating the Act has fifteen or more
employees,”38 and he seems to believe that my view would char-
acterize this requirement as nonjurisdictional.39 But the result here
33. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 826 (1990) (“We have no
reason to question the presumption that state courts are just as able as federal courts to
adjudicate Title VII claims.”).
34. Preis, supra note 5, at 1428-29.
35. I made this clear in my article. Dodson, supra note 1, at 636 (explaining that the
employee-numerosity requirement is a “claim requirement[ ], not [a] forum determinant[ ]”).
36. Cf. id. at 638.
37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
38. Preis, supra note 5, at 1429.
39. Id. (“If a court were to adopt Dodson’s view, [it would] find the numerosity
requirement nonjurisdictional.”).
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is unclear because his hypothetical is incomplete. What matters is
not Congress’s deployment of the term “jurisdiction,” but what the
law does. If his hypothetical requirement limits the kinds of em-
ployers covered by Title VII regardless of where the case is heard,
then it is indeed nonjurisdictional (just like the real employee-
numerosity requirement), and Congress’s misuse of the term “juris-
diction” should be ignored. But the hypothetical language seems
phrased much more in the way of a forum determinant; in other
words, the language could leave Title VII applicable to all employers
regardless of how many employees they have, restrict federal courts
to adjudicating Title VII claims only if pursued against employers
with fifteen or more employees, and leave state court as the sole
forum for employers with fewer employees.40
More information about the substantive scope of this hypothetical
Title VII would be required to confirm it, but if that is what
Professor Preis means, then the hypothetical language is jurisdic-
tional—not because Congress denoted it as such, but because the
language determines which adjudicative forum (federal or state
court) can hear such claims.
Third, Professor Preis mischaracterizes the source of authority for
my approach as a “Platonic ideal” of jurisdiction41 that must mani-
fest itself as some kind of natural law.42 But I do not purport to de-
rive some “brooding omnipresence” of jurisdiction from natural
law.43 Rather, jurisdiction is definitional. It is no different in kind
from other definitional terms in our legal lexicon that have static
meaning, such as “agency,” “relief,” “remedy,” “appeal,” “adjudica-
tion,” and a host of others found throughout the pages of Black’s
Law Dictionary. A sheep is not a sheep because of natural law. A
40. I acknowledge this possibility in my original article. See Dodson, supra note 1, at 637
n.107. I do not, as Professor Preis seems to think, “misperceive[ ] the vesting of state court
jurisdiction.” Preis, supra note 5, at 1428 n.94. The denial of federal question jurisdiction
relegates the pursuit of the claim to state court jurisdiction, which generally opens state
courts to hear such claims.
41. See Preis, supra note 5, at 1426 (“Jurisdictional idealism, as this Article defines it,
holds that there is a Platonic ideal of jurisdiction.”).
42. Id. at 1429 (“The only way to explain its decision would be to hold that, as a matter
of natural law, such definitions of jurisdiction are impermissible.”).
43. Cf. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222-23 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing the common law as “not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice
of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified”).
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sheep is a sheep because that is what we have chosen to call that
kind of animal, and, once chosen, its meaning is static.44 Likewise,
some terminology must describe a law that determines forum in a
multiforum system. The appropriate term is jurisdiction. And, once
that is settled, jurisdiction’s definition is as static as “sheep,” not
because of natural law, but as a matter of definitional law.
B. Defending Against Positivism
Having set the record straight, I now turn to Professor Preis’s
direct attacks on my framework. The first attack is a press for
positivism in jurisdiction’s definition. In Professor Preis’s view,
jurisdiction is positive law, and lawmakers are free to call a wolf a
sheep and force the rest of us to agree.45 I do not dispute that pos-
itive law gets to set where jurisdictional boundaries lie and what the
content of those boundaries are. But I reject Professor Preis’s as-
sertion that positive law also may affix the jurisdictional label to a
boundary that is not jurisdictional.
A principal reason why my definitional account of jurisdiction is
superior to Professor Preis’s positivist account of jurisdiction is that
my definitional account better aligns like doctrines and separates
unlike doctrines. Under my framework, all doctrines that determine
forum in a multiforum system are jurisdictional, while all doctrines
that do not are nonjurisdictional.46 This definition consistently
labels as jurisdictional the usual suspects—personal jurisdiction,
original jurisdiction, and appellate jurisdiction—while augmenting
that group with similar kinds of forum-determining doctrines like
venue, forum non conveniens, and abstention.47 At the same time,
this definition excludes doctrines that limit a court in isolation from
other courts, such as court-specific procedures, claim-specific
44. Incidentally, this is more Aristotelian identity than Platonic ideal. See ARISTOTLE,
METAPHYSICS bk. IV, pt. 4 (W.D. Ross trans., Arcadia ebook 2016); see also G.W. LEIBNIZ, NEW
ESSAYS ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 362 (Peter Remnant & Jonathan Bennett trans. & eds.,
1982) (“Each thing is what it is ... A is A.”).
45. See Preis, supra note 5, at 1417 (stating that if Congress “wants to define ...
jurisdiction in odd ways, it is free to do so—just as all of us are free to call a tail a leg if it
serves our purposes”).
46. See Dodson, supra note 1, at 637.
47. See id. at 637-45.
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requirements, and separation of powers limits.48 A few doctrines
that I acknowledge, including state sovereign immunity and the
political question doctrine, are admittedly more difficult to classi-
fy,49 but, on the whole, my definitional account makes a great deal
of sense.
A positivist approach to defining jurisdiction, by contrast, results
in some very odd groupings. A limitations period in one statute
might be jurisdictional, while in another it is not.50 A deadline to file
a notice of appeal in a civil case might be jurisdictional, while a
deadline to file a notice of appeal in a criminal case is not.51 A claim-
limiting element that naturally appears to be a merits question
might be denoted as jurisdictional.52 One portion of an appellate
rule might be jurisdictional while another is not.53 Presumably,
Congress could denote the amount-in-controversy requirement as
nonjurisdictional. These distinctions have nothing to do with
common sense or the differing functions of the laws at issue. They
are simply the product of congressional whim. A positivist ap-
proach—with its invitation to give “too many[ ] meanings” to jur-
isdiction—results in the very mess the Court has lamented.54
A further demerit of a positivist approach is that it relies upon
an interpretive process that, at times, can be difficult—even
fictional. Congress rarely takes the time to clarify whether a limit
is jurisdictional, and, in many instances, Congress likely never even
considered the question. Thus, recent cases attempting to divine
congressional intent have produced some unconvincing and
48. See, e.g., id. at 645-48.
49. See id. at 648-53.
50. Compare John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-35 (2008)
(affirming a jurisdictional dismissal on grounds that the complaint was filed outside of the
“more absolute” limitations period for a claim filed with the Court of Federal Claims), with
Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94-96 (1990) (holding the deadline to file a
Title VII claim to be nonjurisdictional).
51. Compare Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007) (civil), with Eberhart v. United
States, 546 U.S. 12, 16, 19 (2005) (per curiam) (criminal).
52. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514-16 (2006) (presuming Congress could
make the employee-numerosity requirement jurisdictional).
53. See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 142 (2012) (holding such for the appellate
certification requirement).
54. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting United States
v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
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confusing decisions.55 If avoiding complexity and uncertainty in jur-
isdictional doctrine are primary virtues,56 there’s no better approach
than my definitional account, a point I will return to in Part III.
C. The Continuing Vitality of Jurisdiction
Professor Preis’s second main criticism of my framework is that,
by settling jurisdiction but giving Congress control of its effects, I
have “render[ed] jurisdiction functionally irrelevant” because
“Congress can get exactly what it wants simply by speaking in
terms of effects,” such that “the law of jurisdiction will be replaced
with the law of effects.”57 I agree that Congress can legislate rules
that elide a jurisdictional characterization and speak solely in terms
of effects. Indeed, Congress should. After all, under my framework,
Congress has no control over what is or is not jurisdictional but has
full control over the effects of a rule. And focusing on the effects puts
the legislative thought and emphasis where it matters for the
litigants.58 In my view, that is entirely appropriate; parties should
focus on and litigate the effects of a rule, not its jurisdictional
character.
But just because the effects have overriding importance to liti-
gants does not mean the jurisdictional character of a limit is ir-
relevant. As I noted, “Jurisdictional lines are important for ...
identifying where the boundaries between forums are and how the
55. See, e.g., United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015) (considering
whether a limitations period denoting tort claims against the United States “forever barred”
if not filed within two years is jurisdictional); Gonzalez, 565 U.S. at 139-48 (interpreting
different provisions of the appellate-certification statute). For a discussion of the frailties of
the competing opinions in those cases, see Dodson, supra note 1, at 628, 632-33.
56. See, e.g., Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 20 (2017) (calling
its jurisdictionality rule “both clear and easy to apply”); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77,
94 (2010) (advocating for “[s]imple jurisdictional rules”); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp.,
541 U.S. 567, 582 (2004) (“Uncertainty regarding the question of jurisdiction is particularly
undesirable, and collateral litigation on the point particularly wasteful.”). For a skeptical take
on jurisdictional clarity, see generally Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity,
97 VA. L. REV. 1 (2011).
57. Preis, supra note 5, at 1430.
58. Dodson, supra note 1, at 655-56 (“[T]he legal characterization of [a] boundary as
jurisdictional often will not matter to the individual parties in any given litigation. That is
because the parties are likely to be far more concerned about the particular instrumental
effects of a limit.”).
12
William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 59 [2018], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol59/iss1/4
2018] DEFENDING JURISDICTION 97
various forums relate to each other in the context of a particular
case.”59 In other words, jurisdiction retains doctrinal, relational,
linguistic, and precedential importance.
Doctrinally, jurisdiction is a useful organizing principle for
categorizing adjudicatory limits. As explained above, it helps group
together doctrines that determine forum in a multiforum system,
and it distinguishes that group from doctrines that do not.60 It
serves descriptively to align personal jurisdiction and diversity
jurisdiction without being undermined by their differing effects. At
the same time, it differentiates diversity jurisdiction and standing,
despite the perhaps similar effects of those doctrines.
Jurisdiction is also a relational concept. It “resolves or encourages
territorial disputes within a community of forums” by “erect[ing]
both the fences that separate forums and the gates that cases may
pass through.”61 Importantly, jurisdiction always involves more than
one forum: it either groups them together as legitimate competitors
or alternatives for the same adjudication, or it allocates the adjudi-
cation to one forum over another.62 Jurisdiction thus manages the
relationships among forums with competing claims to a particular
adjudication.
Jurisdiction also has linguistic value. It enhances effective and
productive communication by representing a term with consistent
and immutable meaning. Under a positivist conception of jurisdic-
tion, the term cannot have generalizable meaning because it means
one thing for one law and another thing for another law.63 Under my
framework, by contrast, the assertion “this requirement is jurisdic-
tional” has a settled and useful meaning: the requirement deter-
mines which forums can hear the case and which cannot.64
My approach to jurisdiction would also affect precedent. Admit-
tedly, it would require revisiting some precedent.65 But it would also
59. Id. at 655.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
61. Dodson, supra note 1, at 634.
62. Id.
63. See Preis, supra note 5, at 1431 (defining the positivist approach).
64. See Dodson, supra note 1, at 634.
65. See id. at 655 (identifying, for example, Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011),
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legitimize others, especially the discredited mantra from United
States v. Robinson that appellate deadlines are “mandatory and jur-
isdictional.”66 Under current doctrine, the word “jurisdictional” does
all the work, for “jurisdictional” necessarily includes “mandatory.”67
But under my framework, both terms do independent work: “juris-
dictional” describes the boundary line and imbues it with structural
meaning, while “mandatory” prescribes one of its effects.68
I close this Part with a note of irony. Professor Preis chides me for
“render[ing] jurisdiction ... irrelevant.”69 As I have shown, I have not
done so: jurisdiction retains vitality under my framework. But un-
der Professor Preis’s approach, jurisdiction is, indeed, irrelevant.
Under his approach, both jurisdiction’s meaning and its effects are
subject to positive law.70 As a result, Professor Preis’s jurisdiction
has neither inherent meaning nor a defined set of effects; it is sim-
ply whatever Congress says it is at the particular time and place. It
offers no definitional, doctrinal, relational, linguistic, functional, or
legal relevance.71 What is the point?
III. THE PRESUMPTION-BASED ALTERNATIVE
Professor Preis nevertheless presses forward with a proposal: use
my definition of jurisdiction as a presumption rebuttable by a clear
statement from Congress, which courts would assess by resort to
“various ‘jurisdictional indicators.’”72 He illustrates his approach by
applying it to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) that a court may review only a “final agency action.”73 This
66. 361 U.S. 220, 224 (1960).
67. See Dodson, supra note 1, at 653-54.
68. Id. at 654.
69. See Preis, supra note 5, at 1430.
70. Id. at 1418 (“Under the combined approach I propose, a court would discern a statute’s
jurisdictionality by focusing on the statutory text (a positivist approach).”); id. at 1430
(asserting that I am “undoubtedly correct” that Congress can attach various effects to
jurisdictional limits).
71. Cf. ARISTOTLE, supra note 44, pt. 4 (“If, however, ... one were to say that the word has
an infinite number of meanings, obviously reasoning would be impossible; for not to have one
meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning our reasoning with one
another, and indeed with ourselves, has been annihilated; for it is impossible to think of
anything if we do not think of one thing.”).
72. Preis, supra note 5, at 1438.
73. Id. at 1440 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012)).
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application itself illustrates several difficulties with Professor
Preis’s approach to the jurisdictionality question.
At the outset, his illustration shows just how complicated, and
potentially unhelpful, his approach can be. In his application,
Professor Preis spills a good deal of ink on background understand-
ings of sovereign immunity, the lack of the term “jurisdiction” in the
statute, a close parsing of the textual provision and related provi-
sions, how courts have characterized the language in the past, and
a consideration of the likely effects of the provision in litigation.74
Yet he concludes that most of these features do not clearly resolve
the question,75 and it is unclear (to me, at least) how his presump-
tion in favor of a jurisdictional ideal operates within his analysis. 
Professor Preis ultimately relies primarily on precedent charac-
terizing federal sovereign immunity as jurisdictional and on the
presumed effects of a jurisdictional characterization,76 but there are
problems here, too. One problem with relying on precedent is that
such reliance is a bootstrap: Shouldn’t Professor Preis instead use
his own framework to interrogate the Court’s characterization of
federal sovereign immunity as jurisdictional rather than relying on
the Court’s characterization as part of the framework? Another
problem with relying on precedent is that the precedent here is not
as clear as Professor Preis makes it out to be. True, the Supreme
Court has called federal sovereign immunity “jurisdictional in
nature,”77 but the characterization predominantly comes from the
era in which the term “jurisdiction” was used in profligate and
unthinking ways; today’s federal sovereign immunity opinions tend
to be cagier about its jurisdictional status.78 Further, the APA’s
74. See id. at 1440-46.
75. Id. at 1441 (conceding that “[g]iven sovereign immunity’s jurisdictional nature, but
the usual absence of the word ‘jurisdiction’ in statutory waivers, one can already see the
trouble with a clear statement rule”).
76. See id. at 1441-46.
77. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); see also United States v. Mottaz, 476
U.S. 834, 841 (1986).
78. See, e.g., infra note 80 (citing cases); see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 522 U.S. 130, 133-34 (2008) (avoiding the jurisdictional-characterization question
presented and instead characterizing the limitations period as a “more absolute” bar). This
federal sovereign immunity trend tracks state sovereign immunity. In older cases, the
Supreme Court intimated that state sovereign immunity was jurisdictional. See Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974) (calling state sovereign immunity a doctrine that
“partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar”); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330
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language is a limitation on a waiver of federal sovereign immunity,
rather than an independent grant of federal subject matter jurisdic-
tion,79 and the Supreme Court has been clear that not all conditions
on federal sovereign immunity waivers are themselves jurisdic-
tional.80
Professor Preis relies somewhat more heavily on the supposed
effects of a jurisdictional characterization, including its “strict ap-
plication.”81 But as I have shown, and as Professor Preis agrees,
laws can have strict application without being jurisdictional (and
jurisdictional laws can have flexible application).82 Perhaps the APA
should be strictly applied, but that has no bearing on its jurisdic-
tional character. And even were Professor Preis correct that a strict
application supports a jurisdictional characterization, the fact that
federal sovereign immunity is subject to waiver would seem to
undermine his conclusion that the APA provision is jurisdictional.
On the whole, Professor Preis’s resort to “common jurisdictional
characteristics”83 seems unhelpful to his characterization inquiry.
The far easier approach is to rely on my framework: because the
APA’s language sets a boundary between agency adjudication and
judicial adjudication, it is jurisdictional. Simple. In addition, Con-
gress is free to attach whatever effects it wishes to the finality re-
quirement, including whether it is waivable, subject to equitable
exceptions, or deserves a “strict application.”
(1934) (stating that state sovereign immunity is a restriction on jurisdiction). But, more
recently, the Court has backed away from that position. See Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524
U.S. 381, 391-92 (1998) (stating that the Court “ha[s] not decided” whether state sovereign
immunity is jurisdictional); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997)
(characterizing state sovereign immunity as an “immunity from suit, rather than a
nonwaivable limit on the Federal Judiciary’s subject-matter jurisdiction”).
79. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 106-07 (1977).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1632-33 (2015) (holding
the limitations period of the Federal Tort Claims Act’s waiver of federal sovereign immunity
to be nonjurisdictional); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413-14 (2004) (holding limits
on an attorney-fee waiver of federal sovereign immunity to be nonjurisdictional); Irwin v.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990) (holding a limitations period for a Title
VII suit against the federal government to be nonjurisdictional).
81. Preis, supra note 5, at 1446.
82. Dodson, supra note 1, at 629-31.
83. Preis, supra note 5, at 1446.
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CONCLUSION
Professor Preis’s alternative approach to characterization ques-
tions lacks the organizational power and simplicity of my framework
while simultaneously diluting the vitality of jurisdiction. I repeat
my call for a framework based on an inherent and definitional
meaning of jurisdiction, coupled with a positivist approach to its
effects in specific contexts.
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